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The Political Business Cycle: 
An Institutional Critique and Reconstruction 
Ann Mari  M a y  
John Maynard Keynes's General Theory provided the analytical 
framework and the rationale for using discretionary governmental poli- 
cies to stabilize the economy at full employment. Although the Keynes- 
ian policy prescriptions continued to gain acceptance in the postwar 
period, the zenith of our confidence in the efficacy of stabilization pol- 
icy was not reached until the mid-1960s. However, just as government 
intervention in the economy was becoming widely accepted, the famil- 
iar sound of ceremonial exhortations against governmental interven- 
tion again began to be heard. . . this time in the area of stabilization 
policy. 
One variant of the opposition to government intervention in the 
economy is the all too familiar monetarist attack.' Another variant, 
which is more subtle but growing in importance, is embodied in the 
political business cycle literatuie. This literature argues that self- 
interested politicians will manipulate the economy to enhance their re- 
election prospects, producing a boom and bust cycle. The government, 
according to this literature, is again the perpetrator of programs that 
destabilize, rather than stabilize, the economy. 
It is in this light that the literature on the political business cycle war- 
rants careful consideration and evaluation, for it can be seen as yet an- 
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other argument for ceremonial laissez-faire doctrine in the area of 
stabilization policy. The purpose of this article is to examine the theo- 
retical foundations of the current political business cycle literature and 
offer an alternative institutional framework of analysis.2 The institu- 
tionalist framework developed here allows us to identify the structural 
features of the economy that bring forth the political business cycle pat- 
tern of expansion and contraction, and to analyze the specific institu- 
tional factors that may prevent politicians from engaging in policies 
that result in the political business cycle pattern in a particular histor- 
ical time period. 
The EwIutwn of Thought 
The literature on the political business cycle is currently dominated 
by public choice theorists who argue that self-interested politicians will 
manipulate the economy for political gain. However, the concept of the 
political business cycle has its origins in the writings of the Marxian 
economist, Michal Kalecl~i.~ Suspicious of the optimism of Keynes, 
Kalecki foresaw the continuation of the business cycle or, more cor- 
rectly, the emergence of the political business cycle, not because the 
government was incapable of stimulating demand to alleviate unem- 
ployment, but because government officials would respond to political 
pressure from groups adverse to sustained full empl~yment.~ 
In An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs made ex- 
plicit and legitimate an aspect of political behavior that Kalecki as- 
sumed implicity-that is, political actors are responsive to some 
segment@) of the electorate. Assuming a more pluralistic model, 
Downs postulated that politicians compete for votes by responding to 
the demands of the electorate and are motivated to do so by self- 
interest.$ Drawing explicit parallels with the neoclassical model of per- 
fect competition, Downs postulated the existence of rational political 
actors attempting to maximize votes. Subsequent theories of the politi- 
cal business cycle, in somnambulant fashion, were drawn to the Down- 
sian framework and incorporated this assumption of self-interested 
politicians into their analysis. 
The theoretical foundation for the current literature, which I shall 
refer to as the orthodox approach to the political business cycle, was 
initially put forth by William Nordhaus.6 Nordhaus hypothesized a 
pattern of pre-election boom and post-election slump resulting from 
contractionary policies pursued in the initial years of an incumbent 
president's term, followed by expansionary policies pursued prior to 
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the election. According to Nordhaus, the self-interested, vote- 
maximizing president is constrained in manipulating the economy by 
the short-run Phillips Curve. The contractionary policies represent an 
attempt to reduce inflation and hence inflationary expectations, 
thereby shifting the short-run Phillips Curve downward. As the election 
approaches, expansionary policies are pursued to lower unemployment 
and exploit the short run trade-off between inflation and unemploy- 
ment. 
Subsequent studies of the presidential political business cycle have 
embraced Nordhaus's conceptual framework and have attempted to 
provide statistical evidence to support the hypothesis that presidents 
manipulate the economy to enhance their re-election prospects. Corre- 
lating time series data on economic activity with election years, these 
studies have produced conflicting evidence as to presidential manip- 
ulation of the economy.' 
The literature on the political business cycle then, has attempted to 
analyze the relationship between the polity and the economy, however, 
both the Marxian and the current orthodox approach provide us with 
an explanation of this relationship that is uni-directional. Whereas Ka- 
lecki believed that the economic structure (class interests of the capital- 
ists) controls the political structure, current studies assume that the 
political structure (politicians) manipulate and control the economic 
structure. I will argue that the relationship between the polity and the 
economy is more complex than these previous studies indicate. A more 
satisfying analysis of the political business cycle must acknowledge the 
interactive nature of this relationship between the polity and the econ- 
omy by examining the institutional framework that affects politicians 
and their ability to manipulate the economy. 
Critique of the Orthodox Literature 
The current literature on the political business cycle is flawed on con- 
ceptual grounds by virtue of its neoclassical framework of analysis. The 
neoclassical approach is apparent in the assumption of human nature 
embodied in these studies as well as the ahistorical, ainstitutional na- 
ture of the analysis. In addition, the neoclassical framework prevents 
current studies from analyzing the structural features of the economy 
that make it necessary for politicans to engage in policies that produce 
the political business cycle pattern. 
As previously stated, the orthodox approach hypothesizes that self- 
interested politicians will manipulate the economy by engaging in con- 
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tractionary policies in the early years of the presidential term and 
expansionary policies prior to the election. This hypothesis is problem- 
atic on several levels. First, the assumption of self-interest is exces- 
sively restrictive in that the existence of a president who behaves as an 
ideologue or caretaker of the public good is thus precluded. Although 
history has provided evidence of presidential behavior that conforms 
to the behavioral assumptions of the orthodox model, it is apparent 
that this self-interested behavior has not always emerged.s Whereas the 
orthodox approach views presidential behavior as static and unchang- 
ing, a more realistic approach must view presidential behavior as mal- 
leable and culturally determined. Hence, a more useful theory of the 
political business cycle must focus not on the individual, but on the 
institutions that shape and determine the behavior of the individual. 
Since few would argue that "the economic process is given effect in 
experience only through institutions," it seems incredible that a theory 
of the political business cycle would make no explicit mention of insti- 
tutions and their impact on public p ~ l i c y . ~  Yet, the orthodox approach 
is markedly ainstitutional and ahistorical. This inability of the ortho- 
dox approach to adequately deal with the institutional change has left 
several extremely important aspects of the political business cycle un- 
explained. 
When effectuating policies that result in a political business cycle, the 
president has several policy tools available-changes in government 
spending, changes in taxes, indirect influence over monetary policy 
and, in rare circumstances, wage and price  control^.'^ It is necessary to 
note that none of these tools can be implemented by the president 
alone. For the president to stimulate the economy through changes in 
government spending or changes in taxes requires passage of bills by 
both Houses of Congress. For the president to influence monetary pol- 
icy requires a Federal Reserve chairman who is not only sympathetic 
to the re-election goals of the president, but also capable of exerting the 
necessary power over the policy-making institutions of the Federal Re- 
serve itself11 Not only are these policy-making institutions ignored by 
the orthodox approach, but other important aspects of the operating 
environment of the president are ignored as well. 
The president, when manipulating the economy for political gain, is 
susceptible to exposure by intra- and inter-party opposition candidates, 
as well as the press. If the press exposes expansionary policies as an 
attempt to manipulate the economy, the candidate's credibility as a 
caretaker of the public good may be adversely effected. Likewise, a can- 
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didate engaging in expansionary policies prior to the election may be 
constrained by a more conservative opponent ready to criticize the pol- 
icy as fiscally irresponsible.12 
Finally, the orthodox approach, by virtue of its conceptual frame- 
work, can be viewed as yet another attempt to give ceremonial 
recognition to the failure of the governmental sector in order to revive 
our faith in laissez-faire. By arguing that the political business cycle is 
destabilizing and that it results from the rational behavior of self- 
interested politicans, the solution becomes one of controlling politi- 
cians and limiting their involvement in the realm of stabilization 
policy.13 As such, the orthodox approach entirely avoids a discussion 
of the structural aspects of the economy that cause the political business 
cycle to be a recurrent feature of the economy. 
An Institutional Approach 
Whereas the orthodox approach views the political business cycle as 
emanating from self-interested, vate-maximizing politicians, the insti- 
tutionalist framework developed here views the political business cycle 
pattern of boom and bust as an imperative of corporate capitalism. I 
will argue that the evolution of corporate capitalism has made periodic 
inflation a systemic feature of the economic environment, and that 
politicians must respond to the needs of the corporate sector by reduc- 
ing inflation, but must also respond to the electorate by periodically 
reducing unemployment. 
Not only is the orthodox approach misdirected as to the ultimate 
cause of the political business cycle, but it is insufficient in explaining 
the institutional constraints imposed on a president when attempting 
to fight unemployment prior to an election. In this section, we will iden- 
tify and examine these institutional factors that impinge upon a presi- 
dent's ability to stimulate the economy prior to an election. We will 
also discuss the role that corporate capitalism plays in the political busi- 
ness cycle process. 
In examining the institutional factors affecting the president's desire 
and ability to stimulate the economy prior to an election, the type of 
election must be recognized as an important determinant of presiden- 
tial behavior. According to Edward Tufte, the incentive to stimulate 
the economy prior to the election is greater when the incumbent presi- 
dent is running than when he is not.I4 Furthermore, the mid-term con- 
gressional election may be more important to the incumbent president 
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than even the on-year election when the president is not seeking re- 
election; success at mid-term provides the opportunity for maintaining 
continuity of the president's programs.15 
A second factor affecting a president's decision to attempt to imple- 
ment policies consistent with the political business cycle is the per- 
ceived outcome of the election. Through opinion poll data, presidents 
have access to voter approval ratings and can determine their relative 
standing vis-a-vis opposing candidates. If the president perceivzs that 
the vote share is too small, the president is more likely to manipulate 
the economy to enhance his re-election prospects. However, if the pres- 
ident is virtually assured of victory, the incentive to manipulate the 
economy is diminished and ideological goals may be pursued.16 
A third factor to consider concerns the probability that the activity 
will be detected or exposed to the public. This pressure of exposure has 
its origins in the media, an opposing party candidate, or a rival candi- 
date within the president's own party. If the opposing candidates are 
relatively more conservative than the president, the chances for criti- 
cism and exposure for excessive spending are enhanced. With the press, 
risk of exposure would most likely depend upon the popularity of the 
president. A president who is perceived to be quite popular is less likely 
to receive scrutiny or criticism from the press than a less popular presi- 
dent." 
The ability of the president to expand the economy prior to the elec- 
tion will be determined by the president's ability to gain the 
cooperation of the Congress and the Federal Reserve. Concerning the 
role of Congress, it would appear that the probability of passing expen- 
diture bills would increase if Congress was dominated by the party of 
the president. However, a Republican President facing a Democratic 
Congress may see this as the opportunity to implement some of the 
expansionary policies that may not have been possible at another 
time.18 For the president to manipulate the economy through monetary 
policy requires a Federal Reserve chairman who is not only sensitive 
to the re-election goals of the president but also capable of influencing 
the policy-making institutions of the Federal Reserve. 
An examination of the presidential elections in the past twenty-five 
years reveals some interesting patterns that seem to support the points 
above. First, election returns do appear to be highly sensitive to eco- 
nomic conditions. In the three elections where real disposable income 
was rising at 4 percent or more in the election year, the incumbent party 
won [Table 11. In the election years where real disposable income was 
growing at the lowest rates, 1960, 1968, 1 976, and 1980, the incumbent 
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party lost. In addition, in the three elections since 1964 when the in- 
cumbent party lost, the incumbent party candidate was faced with an 
opposing candidate who was perceived to be more conservative. Fi- 
nally, in the two elections since 1960 where the president was not seek- 
ing re-election, 1960 and 1968, real disposable income grew at a rate 
equal to or below the trend rate and the incumbent party lost. 
Table 1. Total Real Disposable Personal Income: 1959-1981.. 
Total Percentage 
Year (Billions of Dollars) Change 
1959 $1,067.2 --- 
1960 1,091.1 2.2 
1961 1,123.2 2.9 
1962 1,170.2 4.2 
1963 1,207.3 3.2 
1964 1,291.0 6.9 
1965 1,365.7 5.8 
1966 1,431.3 4.8 
1967 1,493.2 4.3 
1968 1,551.3 3.9 
1969 1,599.8 3.1 
1970 1,668.1 4.3 
1971 1,728.4 3.6 
1972 1,797.4 4.0 
1973 1,916.3 6.6 
1974 1,896.6 -1.0 
1975 1,931.7 1.8 
1976 2,001 .O 3.6 
1977 2,066.6 3.3 
1978 2,167.4 4.9 
1979 2,212.6 2.0 
1980 2,214.3 . 0 
1981 2,248.6 1.5 
1982 2,261.5 .6 
1983 2,334.6 3.2 
1984 2,468.4 5.7 
SOURCE: Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President 1986 (Wash- 
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 283. (Quarterly data at sea- 
sonally adjusted annual rates, 1982 dollars.) 
The foregoing factors explain why a particular president may or may 
not be compelled to effectuate policies that produce a political business 
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cycle. These factors also identie the constraints imposed on a president 
when attempting to stimulate the economy prior to an election. How- 
ever, this does not explain the broader structural features of the econ- 
omy that along with the instrumentally inadequate tools of 
stabilization policy, produce these periodic political business cycle epi- 
sodes. 
The growing concentration and consolidation of the business sector 
has been well documented elsewhere, however, the impact of this con- 
solidation on the political business cycle has been neglected by the or- 
thodox approach.lg As John Kenneth Galbraith has pointed out, the 
upward trend in prices is the result of the power of the planning system 
to set prices.20 The corporation, acting rationally in its own self-interest, 
sets prices as a mark up over costs, but collectively produces an out- 
come detrimental to the planning system as a whole-inflati~n.~' The 
planning sector then calls upon government to reduce inflation through 
contractionary policies. Historically, this contraction has been accom- 
plished primarily through monetary policy which, as Galbraith has 
pointed out, does not affect the planning sector as much as the market 
sector.22 In this sense, the initial contraction of the political business 
cycle is not so much the result of manipulative politicans acting in their 
own self-interest, as politicians responding to the needs of the business 
sector. The expansionary policies that often, although not always, pre- 
cede the election are merely the result of politicians who must respond 
to the needs of the electorate in an effort to reduce unemployment. 
It may be argued of course that both the contractionary policies to 
fight inflation and the expansionary policies to reduce unemployment 
reflect attempts by policy-makers to respond to the needs of the elec- 
torate rather than of the business interests. However, I would argue that 
the business sector is at the forefront of the voracious attack against 
the so-called ravages of inflation that have actually benefited the lower 
and middle classe~.~3 This point is also buttressed by the studies on 
voter behavior that indicate that election outcomes are more sensitive 
to unemployment than to inflation.24 
The institutionalist approach presented here argues that the political 
business cycle is a much more complex phenomenon than either the 
Marxian approach of Kalecki, or subsequent orthodox approaches in- 
dicate. In this analysis, the contraction phase of the cycle is the result 
of politicians responding to the needs of the corporate sector by reduc- 
ing inflation, and the expansion phase, if circumstances require and 
permit, represents the politicians responding to the needs of the elec- 
torate by reducing unemployment. 
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The study of the political business cycle is significant in that the or- 
thodox approach merely provides another rationale for limiting the 
role of government in the area of stabilization policy. In contrast, the 
institutionalist approach views the political business cycle as an im- 
perative of an economic system characterized by corporate capitalism 
where the dominant means of regulating economic activity are the 
moribund tools of traditional demand management policies. As a re- 
sult, the solution to the problem of the political business cycle lies not 
in controlling self-interested politicians, as the orthodox approach 
would have us believe, but rather in recognizing the limitations of tradi- 
tional stabilization policies in sustaining full employment without in- 
flation, given the current structure of the economy. 
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